INTRODUCTION
To fulfill our traditional obligation means that we. should provide mechanisms that can produce an acceptable result in the shortest possible time, with the least possible expense, and with a minimum of stress on the participants. That is what justice is all about.
-Warren E. Burgert In a 1982 speech, Chief Justice Warren Burger argued that arbitration represented one of the most promising mechanisms for the efficient achievement of justice and that its use "ha[ d] been neglected"2 in the private sector. Today, growing enthusiasm for all forms of alternative dispute resolution is replacing the neglect to which Burger referred. The increasing number of cases arbitrated in recent years reflects this enthusiasm. 3 The many advantages that arbitration offers over typical courtroom litigation helps to explain this increase. Arbitration typically resolves claims more quickly and with less expense than traditional litigation. 4 Moreover, arbitration provides increased flexibility, which allows parties to adapt it to their particular situation.s Although arbitration does have several weaknesses 6 -notably, the 1. Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 274 (1982 REv. 1305 REv. , 1305 REv. n.7 (1985 (citing 1985 Caseload Figures of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), which showed a 70% increase in the number of labor cases submitted to arbitration under the AAA since 1972).
4. BETTE J. RoTii ET AL., THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE REsoLUTION PRACTICE GUIDE § § 1:2, :19 (1993). Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985) (maintaining that adaptability is a "hallmark[]" of arbitration). Parties to arbitration hearings can often choose their own "judge" and procedures. See RoTii ET AL., supra note 4, § § 3:7, 4:6. By allowing parties to choose their own adjudicator, arbitration provides litigants with the opportunity to choose an individual who possesses a greater level of expertise regarding the dispute than a typical trier of fact might have. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633 (citing "access to expertise" as another hallmark of arbitration).
See
6. Besides the lack of a jury, courts have also criticized the absence of standard rules of evidence and a complete record of proceedings. Arbitration also places tµnitations on rights and procedures available in civil trials, such as discovery and cross-examination. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 57-58 (1974) . Alexander recognized, however, that "it is the informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution." 415 U.S. at 58. The Supreme Court has also recently stated that " [g] eneralized attacks on arbitration .•• are 'far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring [arbitration] .'" Gilmer v. Inter-2171 [Vol. 93:2171 lack of a jriry -many litigants now see arbitration as a superior option to otherwise long and costly resolutions of their claims in court.7
In practice, most arbitrations have the following characteristics in common:
(1) [T] he parties choose to have a dispute or disputes decided by a third party, called an arbitrator; (2) the parties choose the arbitrator or a method for his or her selection; (3) the arbitrator hears the dispute; (4) the arbitrator makes a binding award; (5) the arbitrator's decision is, subject to very limited grounds of review, final and enforceable ... in the same manner as a judgment.s Arbitration in this form was not uncommon at the turn of the century,9 but federal courts generally refused to enforce arbitral agreements until the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA) . 1 0 In addition to making arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," 11 the FAA provides for stays of proceedings pending arbitration1 2 and orders to compel arbitration. 1 3 In recent years the Supreme Court has stated that, by enacting the FAA, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration,14 The Court has expressed further support for arbitration by stating that federal courts should resolve doubts about the scope of arbitration agreements in favor of arbitration.is state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) ( 477, 481 (1989) ).
Arbitration can be inappropriate in some situations. Some statutes grant enforcement powers to administrative agencies to act in the public interest in addition to granting individual causes of action. Arbitration of the individual claims can prevent the administrative agency from carrying out its mandates. Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?, 61 UMKC L. REv. 693, 718-19 (1993) . Other statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, create individual employment rights that Congress never intended to submit to arbitration or that simply may be better protected in a court of law. See generally Jeffrey R. Knight, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 61 DEF. CoUNS. J. 251 (1994) .
7. Arbitration has proven useful in resolving a wide variety of disputes. A glance at the Gilmer, the Court took note of the fact that several amici curiae had argued that the employment contract exception in section 1 of the FAA excluded all contracts of employment from the coverage of the FAA. 25 The Court left the issue "for another day," however, because the parties did not raise the issue in the courts below or in the petition for certiorari and because it was beyond the scope of the case. 26 In his dissent, Justice Stevens decided to address the scope of the employment contract exception anyway and argued for a broad interpretation. 27 Stevens, however, is the only sitting Justice who has articulated an opinion on the subject. This Note argues that courts should adopt a narrow reading of the employment contract exception to the FAA, thus making arbitration agreements in most individual employment contracts enforceable under the Act. Part I argues that a textual analysis of the FAA supports a narrow interpretation of the exception. Because some courts and commentators have argued that the text favors a broad interpretation, Part II examines the legislative history of the exception and demonstrates that no :firm conclusions can be drawn about congressional intent regarding the exception's scope. Finally, Part III demonstrates that a narrow reading of the exception best serves the purposes behind the FAA by overriding judicial hostility toward arbitration, placing arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contract provisions, and providing a more efficient method of adjudication in the workplace.
SUPPORTING A NARROW INTERPRETATION THROUGH TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
Courts begin interpreting a statute by first examining the statute's text. 28 In studying the text, courts "assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. " 2 9 Once a court is satisfied that the text of a statute mandates a partic-25. 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. 26. 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. One commentator has argued that the majority decision actually reflects support for a narrow interpretation of the exception, despite the Court's express reluctance to address it. See Knight, supra note 6. This belief results from the fact that the NYSE registration form at issue in Gilmer was, for all practical purposes, the employment contract. Id. at 253.
27. 500 U.S. at 39-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens argued that the primary concern of the FAA was a desire by the business community to overturn the common law rule that denied specific enforcement of arbitration agreements in business contracts. 500 U.S. at 39. [Vol. 93:2171 u1ar interpretation, an inquiry into the text's meaning is generally finished. 30 In examining the text of the employment contract exception of the FAA, it becomes apparent that the text justifies only a narrow3 1 interpretation of the exception.
The FAA only applies to maritime transactions and those "contract[s] evidencing ... transaction[s] involving commerce."32 The language in section 1 of the FAA defining "commerce" is thus especially significant because "commerce" plays a key role in defining the scope of the FAA: "'[C]ommerce', as herein defined, means commerce among the several States or \vith foreign nations ... but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. " 33 A cursory reading of this text allows at least two possible interpretations of the employment contract exception. First, the language of the final part -"other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" -may be construed broadly as referring to the entire class of workers within the scope of Congress's power over interstate commerce.3 4 Under this interpretation the exception wou1d cover almost all employment contracts. A second, narrower interpretation results from reading "other class of workers" to reach only those classes of workers similar in kind to seamen and railroad employees.3s
An analysis of the text of the FAA produces three textually based arguments in favor of a narrow interpretation as the only reasonable reading of the exception. First, section I.A argues that Congress understood the words engaged in interstate commerce as referring only to those classes of workers involved in the transportation of commerce. Second, section I.B argues that the statutory interpretation canon ejusdem generis supports a narrow interpretation by limiting the general language of the exception. Third, section I.C argues that the traditional maxim that every part of a statute must be given effect also supports a narrow interpretation. Section I.D then responds to the argument that a narrow interpretation of the exception will result in inconsistent definitions of commerce in sections 1and2 of the FAA. This section first con-30. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 , 1169 (1993 (stating that unambiguous statutory language can only be overcome by clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary): Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 873 (1991) (stating that, when the text is clear, judi· cial inquiry is complete except in "rare and exceptional circumstances" (citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991) tends that no such inconsistency exists and then argues that any inconsistency that might exist is explicable by analyzing the statute's text.
A. Engaged in Interstate Commerce vs. Affecting Interstate Commerce
An understanding of Congress's use of the word engaged in other contemporaneous legislation, along with the more limited view of the commerce power that prevailed at the time of the FAA's passage, indicates that a narrow interpretation of the employment contract exception in the FAA is the correct one. At the time of the FAA's passage in 1925, "Congressional power over individuals whose activities affected interstate commerce had not developed to the extent to which it was expanded in the succeeding years. " 36 In fact, the Supreme Court routinely struck down federal statutes that sought to regulate economic activity beyond the interstate movement of goods. 495, 543 (1935) {holding part of the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional in part because the Poultry Code regulated activities taking place after "the flow in interstate commerce had ceased"); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 363 (1935) {hold-ing unconstitutional a compulsory retirement and pension system for all interstate railroads in part because the objectives of the pension system had "no reasonable relation to the business of interstate transportation").
38. 301 U.S. 1 (1937 language to apply only to workers "engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it." 44 Courts construed affecting interstate commerce, on the other hand, to encompass not only workers engaged in the interstate transportation of commerce, but also all workers involved in the manufacture or production of interstate goods.4s
The difference in interpretation between engaged in interstate commerce and affecting interstate commerce -as reflected in the text of the PELA and the 1916 Shanks decision -indicates that when Congress later used the word engaged in the FAA of 1925, and incorporated language substantially similar to the PELA, it likely intended that the language would be interpreted in the same manner as the language had in the PELA.46
In 1939 Congress amended section 1 of the PELA, adding:
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of this Act, be considered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce •.• ,47
Congress had two purposes in amending the PELA: to enable the statute to reflect the Supreme Court's decision in Jones & Laughlin that the commerce power extended to activity that affected interstate commerce, 48 and to settle a frequent subject of litigation under the PELA -the location of the line between interstate and 42. Employers' Liability Act of 1908 , ch. 149, § 1, 35 Stat. 65, 65 (1908 intrastate commerce -by removing the need to determine that line. 49 The amendment, by using the word affect and expanding the reach of the PELA, further demonstrates that Congress believed engaged in interstate commerce covered only a limited class of workers.
The limited scope of engaged in interstate commerce is also reflected in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1928 (FLSA).50 The FLSA, passed three years after the FAA, applied to employees "engaged in commerce," but it also applied to those engaged "in the production of goods for commerce."5 1 This language further indicates that Congress understood the words engaged in interstate commerce to be limited to those workers in the transportation industries.
B. Ejusdem Generis
The statutory interpretation canon ejusdem generis provides a second textual argument in support of a narrow interpretation. The canon counsels that general words that follow more specific words should be limited to the same general class as the specific words. 52 Thus, for example, the word "other" in "grapefruits, oranges, and other fruits" should be limited to citrus fruits. The primary justification for the canon is that Congress has no need to mention specific words or examples if it intends that the most general word or example be used in its unrestricted sense. The language of the employment contract exception embraces three groups of workers: "seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. " 56 The dispute regarding the scope of the exception has revolved, of course, around the final group labeled "any other class of workers." Seamen and railroad workers are classes of workers involved in the interstate transportation of commerce.s1 Under the canon ejusdem generis, therefore, "any other class of workers" should be read as encompassing only those workers involved in the interstate transportation of commerce.
C. Every Part of a Statute Must Be Given Effect
A second traditional maxim of statutory interpretation holds that every part of a statute must be given effect. Nothing in the statute should be "meaningless or superfluous. " 58 Courts justify this maxim by explaining that Congress does not place words in a statute without a purpose. 59 Application of this maxim to the employment contract exception demonstrates that only a narrow reading of the exception utilizes all of the exception's language.
A broad interpretation of the employment contract exception would make the two specific classes of workers mentioned in the exception superfluous. Reading "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"60 to include all workers subject to Congress's commerce power would mean that "other" encompasses seamen and railroad workers and eliminates the need for their specific enumeration. If Congress had intended for the 54. Like all intrinsic aids, courts should only apply the canon when a statute is subject to more than one interpretation. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 74 {1984) (citing Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 588 (1980) exception to be read to encompass all employment contracts, it would have said so rather than enumerating specific classes of workers.6 1 Because Congress elected to enumerate two specific groups of workers, however, and insert a more general clause following them, courts can infer that the exception is supposed to be read narrowly.
It could be argued that a narrow interpretation also violates the statutory maxim because, by defining "any other classes of workers" as referring to classes of workers in the transportation of interstate commerce, "any other classes of workers" also encompasses the specific enumerations of seamen and railroad employees. In fact, however, under a narrow interpretation the specific enumerations provide a context for defining the general class. Therefore, a narrow interpretation of the exception, unlike a broad interpretation, does not violate the maxim that every part of a statute be given effect.
D. Inconsistent Definitions of Commerce in the FAA
Some courts and commentators have argued that a narrow interpretation of the ·employment contract exception produces inconsistent definitions of commerce within sections 1 and 2 of the FAA. Section 2 of the FAA makes all arbitration provisions in "contract[ s] evidencing ... transaction[s] involving commerce ... valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." 62 The Supreme Court has indicated that this section's mandates extend as broadly as the commerce power on which it is based.63 Therefore, a narrow interpretation of "workers engaged in interstate commerce" in section 1 of the Act might seem inconsistent because it is limited to only a small segment of the employees affecting interstate commerce.
There are two responses to this argument. The first is to deny the inconsistency. Unlike section 2 of the FAA, the section 1 exception relates to workers engaged in interstate commerce. As mentioned in section I.A, Congress understood the word engaged to indicate a particular subset of workers who affect interstate commerce -those workers in the transportation industries. Therefore, the word commerce in section 1 does not have a different meaning than commerce in section 2 of the Act.
Even if an inconsistency did exist between the section 1 commerce and the section 2 commerce, the text of the statute provides [Vol. 93:2171 two justifications for this inconsistency. First, exceptions traditionally are construed narrowly. 64 By defining the scope of the section 1 exception as including all employment contracts affecting interstate commerce, the exception may be given a much broader reach than Congress intended. In fact, the Supreme Court has indicated that the FAA reflects Congress's desire to expand and support arbitration.65 A broad exception, therefore, might undercut this goal.
A 
IJ. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EXCEPTION
When a statute permits only one reasonable interpretation, inquiry into the statute's meaning is generally finished because courts will look outside of the statute's text only when the statute can be interpreted in more than one way.67 Although Part I concluded that the text mandates a narrow interpretation of the employment contract exception, some courts have reached the opposite conclusion and held that a broad interpretation is proper. 68 narrow reading, it does not -as some have claimed 7 0 -provide clear support for a broad reading either.
As Part I demonstrated, Congress recognized a distinction between the scope of the words engaged in interstate commerce and affecting interstate commerce. Besides Congress's choice of words in contemporaneous statutes, the distinction is shown in a brief submitted to the Joint Committee of Subcommittees on the Judiciary during hearings on the FAA. 71 This brief, which one commentator has cited as the most important authority on the FAA,12 made a similar distinction between the interstate movement of goods and affecting commerce:
It is not only the actual and physical interstate shipment of goods which is subject to the interstate commerce powers of the Federal Government, but these powers govern every agency or act which bears so close a relationship to interstate commerce that they can reasonably be said to affect it. 73 This brief is perhaps the most persuasive evidence that in passing the FAA Congress understood engaged in interstate commerce to encompass only those workers involved in the transportation of interstate commerce, while Congress understood affecting interstate commerce to reach those workers who produced the goods for transportation as well.
The legislative history of the FAA is short and contains little mention of the employment contract exception. The FAA is somewhat unusual in that Congress had a limited role in drafting the statute. Instead, the American Bar Association (ABA) drafted the initial language and some of the amendments to the Act.7 4 In December 1922, Senator Sterling and Congressman Mills introduced the first draft of the bill that was to become the FAA. 75 70. See, e.g., Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 1991 This draft did not contain the employment contract exception. In response to concerns raised at a subcommittee hearing on the bill, the ABA made several revisions in the bill -including the addition of the employment contract exception -before reintroducing it in the next Congress. This draft, with minor changes, became the FAA. 16 The ABA added the language comprising the employment contract exception in response to fears raised by the Seamen's Union. The union argued that "seamen's wages came within admiralty jurisdiction and should not be subject to an agreement to arbitrate."77 During the initial hearing on the FAA before a Senate subcommittee, W.H.H. Piatt, the chairman of the ABA committee that drafted the FAA, responded to this criticism:
It was not the intention of this bill to make an industrial arbitration [sic] in any sense; and so I suggest that ... if your honorable committee should feel that there is any danger of that, they should add to the bill the following language, "but nothing herein contained shall apply to seamen or any class of workers in interstate and foreign commerce." It is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes at all.1s
Piatt's statement could be construed to indicate that it was not the intention of the drafters to include employment contracts -or at least collective bargaining agreements -within the scope of the statute. As such, this statement probably furnishes the strongest argument in favor of a broad interpretation of the exception. adopts an amendment urged by a witness, it may be assumed that the intent voiced was adopted by the legislature."). Oddly, however, courts advocating the broad interpretation Nevertheless, there are reasons to doubt the utility of Piatt's statement as a basis for a broad interpretation.
First, Piatt's statement that the FAA was not an "industrial arbitration" intended to cover "labor disputes,"BO could be construedwith equal plausibility -to reflect a belief that the FAA would not cover collective bargaining agreements, as opposed to individual employment contracts. Seamen and railroad workers -the particular classes mentioned in the employment contract exceptionwere unionized workforces and were already subject to arbitration by other statutes.s 1 In addition, the exception was added directly in response to the Seamen's Union. 82 Both of these factors indicate that even the draftsmen of the FAA may not have intended the exception to extend to individual employment contracts.
Second, an exchange between Piatt and Senator Walsh, the committee chair, demonstrates that the draftsmen's interpretation of the bill's language may have differed from that of Congress. The exchange, which followed Piatt's statement, indicates that the Senator may not have understood the insertion of the language comprising the employment contract exception to exclude all employment contracts. After Piatt's statement, Senator Walsh responded by asserting: "I see no reason at all ... why, when two men voluntarily agree to admit their controversy to arbitration, they should not be compelled to have it decided that way."83 Piatt responded simply "Yes, sir."84 Senator Walsh then reflected: "The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts that are entered into are really not voluntary things at all .... It is the same with a good many contracts of employment."85 This exchange, including Senator Walsh's remark about adhesion contracts, indicates that it was not clear from Piatt's original statement that all employment contracts should be excluded from the FAA.
Finally, determining congressional intent is difficult in normal circumstances, 86 but determining intent is even more difficult in the [Vol. 93:2171 case of the FAA, because the ABA, rather than Congress, drafted the statute. As one commentator has noted, "When [Congress] simply enacts legislation presented to it, the proper question is how Congress understood what was presented and upon which it put its stamp of approval." 87 Furthermore, there was almost no debate on the FAA when it was brought to the House and Senate floorsmaking it even more dangerous to impute the intentions of the bill's drafters to the entire Congress.ss Although these arguments regarding the legislative history of the FAA do not necessarily support a narrow interpretation of the employment contract exception, they do demonstrate that no clear message regarding the scope of the exception can be derived from that legislative history. In light of the textual analysis of Part I, which demonstrated that a narrow interpretation is the only reasonable reading of the exception, the absence of any clear, contrary message in the legislative history means that courts should give effect to this reasonable reading.
ill. EFFECTUATING THE PURPOSES OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION Acr
Part I demonstrated that the text of the FAA favors a narrow interpretation of the employment contract exception and Part II showed that the legislative history does not support a contrary reading. Many courts might find it appropriate to stop here. In general, however, statutes must be construed to effectuate their purposes, and courts should avoid constructions that defeat those purposes. 89 This Part examines the purposes of the FAA and argues that a narrow interpretation of the employment contract exception best effectuates these purposes. Section ID.A identifies the three principal purposes behind passage of the FAA: overriding the longstanding judicial hostility toward arbitration, placing agreements to arbitrate on an equal footing with other contract provisions, and providing tended because "[t]he question of meaning lies deeper than the law"). Some commentators have even argued that "legislative intent" is somewhat of a fallacy due to the differing motives and understandings of the many members making up a legislature. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INTI.. REv. L. & ECON. 239, 244 (1992) .
frl. MACNEIL, supra note 8, at 108. 88. Because so few members of Congress are likely to have had a chance to hear Piatt's understanding of the legislation's scope, most would have been likely to form their own opinions about the bill when, and if, they personally read the bill before voting on it. But cf. 2A SINGER, supra note 52, § 48.06 (arguing that, when parts of a bill pass without change, one can infer legislative intent for a bill from the intentions of the committee that drafted it).
89. Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984) (arguing that a court's duty is to "find that interpretation which can most fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress manifested") (quoting NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
for more speedy and cost-effective adjudication. Section m.B then argues that a narrow interpretation of the exception serves these purposes because: (i) a broad interpretation would maintain the effect of the former judicial hostility to arbitration; (ii) a narrow interpretation will make agreements to arbitrate in individual employment contracts irrevocable and enforceable in the federal court system; (iii) and a narrow interpretation will result in more efficient adjudication of employment-related disputes.
A. The Purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act
Congress had three purposes in enacting the FAA. The first of these was to override a longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.9o At the time Congress passed the FAA, judges had developed a disdain for arbitration. Judges were primarily reacting to fear that they would be ousted from much of their jurisdiction,91 although they may have had more noble reasons as well.92
The second purpose behind the FAA's passage was to place agreements to arbitrate on an equal footing with other contract provisions.93 At the time of the Act's passage, arbitration agreements were largely ineffective because, unlike other contract provisions, no law prevented a party to an arbitration agreement from revoking that agreement at any time. 94 The FAA sought to correct this deficiency by making arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 5
The third and final purpose for the passage of the FAA was to provide for more speedy and cost-effective adjudication. Congress believed that arbitration could alleviate the overcrowding of court dockets, result in quicker decisions, and remove the burden of costly litigation.96 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Con-90. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1984); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974) gress recognized the efficiency benefits that arbitration would bring 97 and lower courts have continued to emphasize these benefits as an important goal of the Act.98 The congressional hearings99 and the committee reports 100 for the FAA also emphasize Congress's recognition of the efficiency benefits of the Act.101 [T] he party willing to perform his contract for arbitration is not subject to the delay and cost of litigation.
..
• It is practically appropriate that the action should be taken at this time when there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration .. •. 97. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) .
98. See, e.g., Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 722 (4th Cir.1990 ), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 983 (1990 cial bodies of the country have been urging the adoption of this ... legislation throughout the country .... "), 3 ("The foundation of our commercial structure is a contract in which is an arbitration clause."), 9 ("It is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other ..•. ").
The purposes of the Act, however, were not so limited. No. 536 , supra note 76, at 1 (removing the words "contract or" from section 2 of the FAA and amending the section to read "maritime transaction or contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce").
Senator Walsh questioned speakers in one hearing about the Act's utility in labor agreements, insurance contracts, and construction contracts, indicating that he viewed the Act's language as reaching beyond commercial disputes. See Hearings Before 67th Congress, supra note 75, at 9-10. In response to the questioning about labor agreements, Piatt stated that it
B. Fulfilling the Goals of the FAA
A narrow interpretation of the employment contract exception best effectuates each of the purposes behind the FAA's passage. Unlike a broad interpretation of the employment contract exception, a narrow interpretation effectuates the congressional purpose of overriding judicial hostility towards arbitration. Prior to the FAA, the hostility toward arbitration manifested itself in a refusal by judges to enforce agreements to arbitrate. 102 Yet, a broad interpretation of the employment contract exception could also result in the nonenforcement of agreements in individual employment contracts.103 A narrow interpretation, by contrast, will require courts was not the draftsmen's intention that the FAA extend to labor disputes and suggested to Senator Walsh that the language of the employment contract exception be added. Id. at 9. As has previously been demonstrated, however, the language comprising this exception encompassed only a few distinct classes of labor contracts and not all employment contracts.
See supra Part I. Significantly, when Senator Walsh next questioned Piatt about insurance agreements, Piatt stated similarly that "it is not the intention of this bill to cover insurance cases," but offered no similar exempting language. Hearings Before 67th Congress, supra note 75, at 9-10. This exchange demonstrates that Senator Walsh contemplated that the Act would reach more than commercial disputes -even if the draftsmen did not.
Moreover, the insertion of the employment contract exception does not limit the FAA's purposes to commercial transactions. Instead, it simply indicates a desire to exempt certain classes of workers from the scope of these general purposes. As noted previously, the draftsmen created the exception in direct response to the desire of the Seamen's Union that issues such as wages remain under admiralty jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying note 77.
This context indicates that the purpose of the exception was not to limit the scope of the Act to purely commercial transactions, but to placate certain classes of workers who wished to remain exempt from the provisions of the Act.
102. Judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements is largely a relic of the past. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1989) (describing a steady erosion of hostility beginning in the lower federal courts). But cf. Securities Indus. Assn. v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 , 1119 (1st Cir. 1989 ("[C] ourts must be on guard for artifices in which the ancient suspicion of arbitration might reappear."), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956 (1990) . The hostility has disappeared primarily because judges have observed the benefits of the arbitration system including a reduction of the burden on the court system. In addition, respect for arbitration has increased as the competence of the arbitrators has grown and their utility in complex, technical cases has become apparent. John C. Norling, Note, DISP. RESOI ... 139, 144-45 (1991) (stating that the competence of arbitral tribunals is higher than ever and that they are better suited to handle highly technical cases).
103. Cf. Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 , 1068 (2d Cir. 1972 ) (stating that the FAA should "be implemented in such a way as to make arbitration effective and not to erect technical and unsubstantial barriers" such as those created in the time when courts viewed arbitration "with suspicion and hostility"). Although judicial hostility toward arbitration is largely a thing of the past, see supra note 102, there is no statutory enforcement mechanism other than the FAA for agreements to arbitrate in individual employment contracts. Under a broad interpretation, federal judges would have to resort to the federal common law of contracts -which is still largely undeveloped and rife with constitutional difficulties, see Arturo Gandera, Contracts in Wonderland: A Fable Regarding the Administrative Adjudication of Qualifying Facility Contracts in California, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 307, 366-97 (1994) (detailing the difficulties of applying federal law to adjudicate contract disputes involving utilities) -or, more likely, borrow from state statutes and common law regarding contracts and arbitration. Under the latter approach, local differences could "cause unequal treatment, vitiate the national purpose underlying the Act, and undermine the pre-emptive to enforce these agreements in individual employment contracts by malting them "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. " 1 04
A narrow interpretation of the employment contract exception also better serves the purpose of placing arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contract provisions. Under a broad interpretation, parties would continue to be able to repudiate voluntary agreements to arbitrate in individual employment contracts, even though other ·contract provisions would remain enforceable. A broad interpretation would thus deal a serious blow to the equality of arbitration provisions vis-a-vis other contract provisions that courts are not free to disregard. A narrow interpretation, however, would enable courts to enforce arbitration provisions in individual employment contracts just like any other· contractual arrangement, which was what Congress sought to achieve.1os
The Fourth Circuit has already shown a determination to fulfill the purpose of equal treatment of arbitration provisions under the FAA in another situation. In Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 106 the court stated that the FAA preempted a Virginia law prohibiting mandatory arbitration. 1 01 The court felt that the FAA prohibited states from placing greater restrictions upon arbitration provisions than other contractual provisions.1os A broad interpretation of the employment contract·exception would have an effect similar to that of the rejected Vrrginia law -it would subject arbitration provisions in individual employment contracts to a different standard than other contract provisions by rendering them unenforceable. 109 Finally, a narrow interpretation of the employment contract exception would best serve the purposes of reducing costly courtroom effect accorded the Act." Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 Tui.. L.
litigation and expediting resolutions of controversies.11° A broad interpretation, by permitting courts to ignore arbitration provisions, would send a continuous stream of employment related disputes to the already overburdened court system. In contrast, a narrow interpretation will allow arbitrators to resolve most of these disputes more quickly and with less cost to the parties by utilizing the benefits of arbitration to their fullest.
CONCLUSION
When Congress enacted the FAA, it viewed arbitration as a ·bet-ter means to an equally just end. The members realized that, in many situations, arbitration is a better method of dispute resolution than courtroom litigation. Nowhere is this more true than in the employment context, as demonstrated by the increasing number of individual employment contracts containing arbitration clauses. 1 11 Further, employees often lack the :financial means to pursue even the strongest of claims in a court of law. Employers, meanwhile, cannot afford the loss of productivity and morale that long employment disputes often create. Arbitration allows these parties to resolve their disputes more quickly and with less expense than typical courtroom litigation. Perhaps even more important, arbitration's less adversarial nature offers each side a chance to sit down, face each other, and communicate. These advantages would be lost, however, if the FAA's employment contract exception were read too broadly. Courts should recognize these compelling justifications and construe the provision narrowly, allowing employees and employers to enforce arbitration agreements. In so doing, courts will fulfill the purposes of the FAA: to strengthen and encourage the use of arbitration in dispute resolution.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5. 111. See S. Gale Dick, Feature, ADR at the Crossroads, 49 DISP. REsoL J. 47, 52 (1994) ("More and more firms in certain industries are inserting mandatory arbitration clauses into their employment contracts • . .
• [E]mployment disputes promise to be one of the biggest growth areas for ADR in the coming years.").
